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An issue of an epistemic logic with justification has been discussed
since the early 1990s. Such a logic, along with the usual knowledge oper-
ator 2F (F is known), should contain assertions t:F (t is a justification
for F ), which gives a more nuanced and realistic model of knowledge. In
this paper, we build two systems of epistemic logic with justification: the
minimal one—S4LP—which is an extension of the basic epistemic logic S4
by an appropriate calculus of justification corresponding to the logic of
proofs LP, and S4LPN—which is S4LP augmented by the explicit negative
introspection principle ¬(t:F )→2¬(t:F ). Epistemic semantics for both
systems are suggested. Completeness and specific properties of S4LP and
S4LPN, reflecting the explicit character of those systems, are established.
1 Introduction
The need for a logic of knowledge with justifications has been discussed by
van Benthem in [33]. Such a logic should contain assertions of the form 2F
(F is known) along with those of the form t : F (t is a justification for F )
bringing together the implicit and explicit components of our informal notion
of knowledge.
The explicit character of judgments significantly expands the expressive
power of epistemic logics. The traditional Hintikka-style modal logic approach
to knowledge has the well-known defect of logical omniscience, caused by an
unrealistic stipulation that an agent knows all logical consequences of his/her
assumptions ([15, 27, 30, 31]). Hence, the usual epistemic modality 2F should
be regarded as “potential knowledge” or “knowability” (cf. [18]) rather than
actual knowledge. Evidence operators t:F provide a more nuanced and realistic
model of knowledge. This new langauge enables us to formulate new logical
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principles about knowledge. For example, in the context of mathematical prov-
ability, the modal principle of negative introspection ¬2F→2¬2F is not valid.
A purely explicit version of negative introspection ¬(x:F )→ t(x):¬(x:F ) does
not hold in the logic of proofs LP either. However, negative introspection in
a mixed explicit-implicit form ¬(t :F ) → 2¬(t :F ) is valid in the provability
semantics, providing a good reason for considering this principle in the context
of logic of knowledge in general.
The ability of terms to encode the complexity of justifications could be useful
in dealing with the logical omniscience problem, since an evidence term t in t:F
carries information about how hard it was to justify F from given assumptions.
In this paper, we derive basic principles of knowledge and justification from
the laws of proofs and provability. The provability semantics is a representative
case of the epistemic reading of modal logic, and as such sheds light on the logic
of knowledge with justification in general.
The idea of the logic of proofs as an explicit counterpart of S4 first appeared
in Go¨del’s [20]. The formal system LP of the logic of proofs was introduced in
[3, 4]. LP describes all valid principles of proof operators t:F
t is a proof of F in Peano arithmetic (1)
with an appropriate set of operations on proofs sufficient to realize the modal
logic S4 explicitly [4]. A similar explicit counterpart of S5 was found in [8].
A semantical approach to the logic of proofs as a general calculus of evidence
in the epistemic framework has been developed by Mkrtychev and Fitting in
[16, 18, 26].
Joint logics of proofs and provability, studied in [2, 9, 28, 29, 32, 34], are
of special interest for this paper since they serve as a prototype of the logic of
knowledge with justification.
In this paper, we introduce and study basic epistemic logics with justifica-
tion. We construct two systems. The basic one, S4LP, consists of S4 combined
with LP as a calculus of justifications and the principle t:F →2F connecting
implicit and explicit knowledge operators. S4LP may be regarded as the generic
epistemic logic with justification where no specific assumptions are made con-
cerning explicit knowledge. The other system, S4LPN, is S4LP augmented by
the principle of explicit negative introspection ¬(t :F )→ 2¬(t :F ) which first
came up in the logics of proofs and provability. Alternatively, S4LPN can be
axiomatized over S4LP by the principle of decidability of evidence assertions
2t:F ∨2¬(t:F ).
In our technical report [9] we used Fitting models [16], originally designed for
the logic of proofs LP, as a semantics for S4LP. In [17], Fitting showed that S4LP
is complete with respect to this semantics. In [6], the first author augmented
Fitting semantics by a new feature, an evidence accessibility relation. This
more general class of models, AF-models, already covers all the above systems:
LP, S4LP, and S4LPN (as well as a broad class of the so-called evidence-based
common knowledge systems from [6]).
In this paper we give soundness and completeness theorems for S4LP and
S4LPN with respect to AF-semantics. Furthermore, both S4LP and S4LPN are
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shown to enjoy the arithmetical provability semantics when 2F is interpreted
as the so-called strong provability operator (cf. [13]):
F is true and provable in Peano arithmetic .
S4LP and S4LPN provide a framework for reasoning about knowledge and
justification and hence answer a question concerning such logics raised by van
Benthem in [33]. Epistemic logics with justification and similar systems were
used in recent work [6] on the common knowledge phenomenon.
2 The logic of proofs as a general calculus of
justification
The logic of proofs LP was inspired by the classical works of the 1930s by
Kolmogorov [23] and Go¨del ([19, 20]) and found in [3, 4] (see also surveys [5, 7,
14]). LP naturally extends classical propositional logic by adding symbolically
represented proofs into the language of the system. Internal proof terms in
LP are called proof polynomials. A new formula formation rule is postulated,
stating that t :F is a formula whenever t is a proof polynomial and F is an
arbitrary formula, hence the language of LP is a general propositional proof-
carrying language. According to the completeness theorems from [3, 4], LP
captures exactly the set of all valid logical principles concerning propositions
and mathematical proofs with a fixed, sufficiently rich set of operations on
proofs. Moreover, by the realization theorem ([3, 4]), proof polynomials suffice
to recover the explicit provability content in all S4-theorems (and hence all
intuitionistic propositional theorems) by realizing modalities in the latter with
appropriate proof terms. In a more general setting LP may be regarded as a
device that makes reasoning about knowledge explicit and keeps track of the
evidence.
Here are some formal definitions.
Definition 1. Proof polynomials are terms built from proof variables x, y, z, . . .
and proof constants a, b, c, . . . by means of three operations: application “·”
(binary), union “+” (binary), and proof checker “!” (unary).
Definition 2. Using t to stand for any proof polynomial and S for any sentence
variable, the formulas are defined by the grammar
A = S | A1→A2 | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | ¬A | t:A .
We assume also that “t:” and “¬” bind stronger than “∧” and “∨,” which bind
stronger than “→ .”
Definition 3. The logic of proofs LP has the following Hilbert-style axioms and
rules:
I. The standard set of axioms A1-A10 from [22] (or a similar system)
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R1. Modus Ponens
II. LP1. s:(F→G) → (t:F→(s·t):G) (application)
LP2. t:F → !t:(t:F ) (proof checker)
LP3. s:F→(s+t):F , t:F→(s+t):F (union)
LP4. t:F→F (explicit reflexivity)
R2. ` c:A, where A is an axiom from I - II and c is a proof constant
(constant specification rule)
The principle LP1 specifies the basic operation of application: a justification of
an implication F →G applied to any justification of the premise F returns a
justification of the conclusion G. LP2 is the verifiability property of evidence:
for any evidence t of a fact F , the result of applying a checker to t, !t, provides
a justification of t:F . LP3 reflects the monotonicity principle: a justification for
F remains a justification after adding any additional evidence. Finally, LP4 is
the reflexivity property, which is provably valid.
A constant specification CS is a set {c1:A1, c2:A2, . . .} of formulas in which
each Ai is an axiom from I-II and each ci is a proof constant. By default, with
each derivation in LP we associate a constant specification CS that consists of
formulas introduced in this derivation by the rule of constant specification. The
claim that F is derivable in LP is equivalent to the existence of a derivation
with a constant specification CS associated with this derivation, i.e.:
F is derivable given c1:A1, . . . , cn:An .
LP is closed under substitutions of proof polynomials for proof variables and
formulas for propositional variables, and LP enjoys the deduction theorem.
In addition to the arithmetical completeness theorem, LP enjoys two funda-
mental properties: internalization and realizability.
Proposition 1. (Internalization) If A1, . . . , Ak ` F then for some proof poly-
nomial p(x1, . . . , xk)
x1:A1, . . . , xk:Ak ` p(x1, . . . , xk):F .
Proposition 2. (Realizability) There is an effective procedure that constructs
a realization r, which substitutes proof polynomials for all modalities in a given
S4-derivation of formula F and thereby produces formula F r derivable in LP.
The logic of proofs LP may be regarded as the explicit version of S4. A
paper [8] introduced a variant of the logic of proofs corresponding to S5. Logics
of proofs corresponding to the modal logics K, K4, D, D4, and T were described
in [10, 11].
3 Basic epistemic logic with justification
We introduce the basic epistemic logic with justifications, S4LP, consisting of S4
as the “knowledge component” and LP as the “justification component” together
with the principle t:F→2F connecting explicit and implicit knowledge.
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Definition 4. Proof polynomials for S4LP are the same as proof polynomials for
LP, i.e. they are terms built from variables x, y, z, . . . and constants a, b, c, . . .
by means of three operations, application “·” (binary), union “+” (binary), and
evidence checker “!” (unary). Formulas of the language of S4LP are defined by
the grammar
A = S | A1→A2 | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | ¬A | 2A | t:A .
We assume also that “t:,” “2,” and “¬” bind stronger than “∧” and “∨,” which
bind stronger than “→ .”
Definition 5. The system S4LP has the following axioms and rules:
I. Classical propositional logic
A1-A10. (the standard set of axioms, e.g., from [22])
R1. Modus ponens
II. Logic of Proofs LP
LP1. s:(F→G) → (t:F→(s·t):G) (application)
LP2. t:F → !t:(t:F ) (inspection)
LP3. s:F→(s+t):F , t:F→(s+t):F (union)
LP4. t:F→F (reflexivity of explicit knowledge)
R2. ` c:A, where A is an axiom from I-IV and c is a proof constant
(constant specification)




R3. ` F ⇒ ` 2F
IV. Principle connecting explicit and implicit knowledge
C1. t:F→2F (explicit-implicit connection)
Obviously, S4LP contains both LP and S4. The principle LP4 is redundant but
we keep it listed for convenience. S4LP is closed under substitutions of proof
polynomials for proof variables and formulas for sentence variables. S4LP also
enjoys the deduction theorem.
Consider a constant specification CS = {c1 :A1, c2 :A2, . . .} (where each Ai
is an axiom from I-IV and each ci is a proof constant). By S4LPCS we mean a
subsystem of S4LP where R2 is restricted to producing formulas from a given
CS only. In particular, S4LP∅ is the subsystem of S4LP without R2.
Lemma 1. The principle of positive introspection
t:F→2t:F
is provable in S4LP∅ (hence in S4LPCS for any constant specification CS).
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Proof.
t:F→ !t:(t:F ) by LP2
!t:(t:F )→2t:F by C1
t:F→2t:F by propositional logic
2
Lemma 2. S4LPCS ` F ⇔ S4LP∅ `
∧ CS→F .
Proof. The direction “⇐” is straightforward. “⇒” is proven by induction on
the derivation of F in S4LPCS. The only interesting case is the rule of neces-
sitation R3. If F is obtained by the necessitation rule R3, i.e., F is 2G and
S4LPCS ` G, then by the induction hypothesis, S4LP∅ `












∧ CS→F . 2
Lemma 3. For any formula F, there are proof polynomials upF (x) and downF (x)




1. x:F→2F by C1
a:(x:F→2F ) specifying constant a, by R2
!x:(x:F )→(a·!x):2F by LP1 and propositional logic
x:F→ !x:(x:F ) by LP2
x:F→(a·!x):2F by propositional logic
It suffices now to set upF (x) to a·!x with a:(x:F→2F ).
2. 2F→F by E3
b:(2F→F ) specifying constant b, by R2
x:2F→(b · x):F by LP1 and propositional logic
It suffices now to set downF (x) to b · x with b:(2F→F ). 2
Proposition 3. (Constructive necessitation) If S4LP ` F , then S4LP ` p:F for
some proof polynomial p.
Proof. Induction on a derivation of F . Base: F is an axiom. Then use
constant specification rule. In this case, p is an arbitrary proof constant and
p:F is included in the constant specification corresponding to this derivation.
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Induction step: Let F be obtained from X→F and X by modus ponens. By
the induction hypothesis, ` s:(X→F ) and ` t:X, hence by LP1, ` (s·t):F and
hence p is s·t. If F is obtained by R2, then F is c:A for some constant c and
axiom A. Use the axiom LP2 to derive !c:(c:A), i.e., !c:F . Here p is !c. If F is
obtained by R3, then F = 2G and ` G. By the induction hypothesis, ` t:G for
some proof polynomial t. Use Lemma 3.1 to conclude that ` upG(t):2G, and
put p = upG(t).
Note that the proof polynomial p is always a ground term and built from
proof constants by applications and proof checker operations only. Moreover,
the presented derivation of p:F does not use rule R3. 2
The necessitation rule R3 is derivable from the rest of S4LP. Indeed, if ` F
then, by Proposition 3, ` p :F for some proof polynomial p. By C1, ` 2F .
However, the rule of necessitation is not redundant in S4LPCS for any finite
constant specification CS. To emulate the rule of necessitation one needs to
apply constructive necessitation to the unbounded set of theorems of S4LPCS,
which requires an unbounded set of constant specifications.
The following property of S4LP is a generalization of constructive necessita-
tion (Proposition 3). It is the explicit analogue of the rule
A1, . . . , Ak,2B1, . . . ,2Bn ` F
2A1, . . . ,2Ak,2B1, . . . ,2Bn ` 2F
which holds in any normal modal logic containing K4.
Proposition 4. (Lifting) If A1, . . . , Ak, y1 :B1, . . . , yn :Bn ` F , then for some
proof polynomial p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yn)
x1:A1, . . . , xk:Ak, y1:B1, . . . , yn:Bn ` p(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yn):F .
Proof. Similar to Proposition 3 with two new base clauses. If F is Ai, then xi
can be taken as p. If F is yj:Bj , then p is equal to !yj . 2
Proposition 5. (Internalization) If A1, . . . , Ak ` F , then for some proof poly-
nomial p(x1, . . . , xk)
x1:A1, . . . , xk:Ak ` p(x1, . . . , xk):F.
Proof. A special case of Proposition 4. 2
The internalization property states that any derivation in S4LP can be internal-
ized as a proof polynomial and verified in S4LP itself.
Note that axiom C1 in S4LP can be replaced by the explicit positive intro-
spection principle t:F→2t:F . The new system will coincide with S4LP modulo
replacement of some constants by ground proof polynomials.
7
4 Introducing explicit negative introspection
As was noticed earlier, the explicit negative introspection principle
¬t:F→2¬t:F
holds when we interpret 2 as mathematical provability, thus suggesting it as an
important epistemic principle.
Definition 6. The system S4LPN has the same syntax, axioms, and rules as
S4LP with one additional axiom:
C2. ¬t:F→2¬t:F (explicit negative introspection)
S4LPNCS is S4LPN with the rule R2 limited to a given constant specification CS.
S4LPN∅ is S4LPNCS with the empty constant specification.
Analogues of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 as well as Propositions 3, 4, and 5 hold for
S4LPN as well.
Lemma 4. The principle of decidability of explicit knowledge
2t:F ∨2¬t:F
is provable in S4LPN (hence in S4LPNCS for any constant specification CS).
Proof.
t:F→2t:F positive introspection
¬t:F→2¬t:F by negative introspection
(t:F ∨ ¬t:F )→(2t:F ∨2¬t:F ) by propositional logic
2t:F ∨2¬t:F by propositional logic
2
5 Models
Kripke-style models for modal logics with justification were introduced in [2] and
then generalized in [9, 28, 29, 34]. A new type of models capturing evidence
was developed in [16, 26] for the logic of proofs LP and in [9, 17] for S4LP. A
general class of models covering all of the above and providing semantics for
S4LPN as well as for the so-called evidence-based common knowledge systems
was introduced in [6].
At the heart of this semantics lies the idea, which can be traced back to
Mkrtychev and Fitting ([16, 26]), of augmenting Boolean or Kripke models with
an evidence function, which assigns “admissible evidence” terms to a statement.
The statement t:ϕ holds in a given world u iff both of the following conditions
are met:
1) t is an admissible evidence for ϕ in u;
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2) ϕ holds in all worlds accessible from u.
The second idea came from the paper [6] which introduced an “evidence acces-
sibility” relation different from the knowledge accessibility relation, thus seman-
tically separating explicit knowledge from usual knowledge.
A frame is a structure (W,R,Re), where W is a non-empty set of states
(possible worlds), R is a binary accessibility relation on W , and Re is a binary
evidence accessibility relation on W . For our purposes, the relations R and Re
can be taken as reflexive and transitive. Re should contain R but not necessarily
coincide with R.
Given a frame (W,R,Re), a possible evidence function E is a mapping from
worlds and justification terms to sets of formulas. We can read F ∈ E(u, t) as
“F is one of the formulas for which t serves as possible evidence in world u.”
An evidence function must obey conditions that respect the intended meanings
of the operations on justification terms (i.e. proof polynomials).
Definition 7. E is an evidence function on (W,R,Re) if for all proof polynomi-
als s and t, for all formulas F and G, and for all u, v ∈W , each of the following
hold:
1. Monotonicity: uRev implies E(u, t) ⊆ E(v, t).
2. Application: F→G ∈ E(u, s) and F ∈ E(u, t) implies G ∈ E(u, s·t).
3. Inspection: F ∈ E(u, t) implies t:F ∈ E(u, !t).
4. Sum: E(u, s) ∪ E(u, t) ⊆ E(u, s+ t).
A model is a structure M = (W,R,Re, E , ° ) where (W,R,Re) is a frame
with an evidence function E on (W,R,Re) and ° is an arbitrary mapping from
sentence variables to subsets of W .
Given a model M = (W,R,Re, E , ° ), the forcing relation ° is extended
from sentence variables to all formulas by the following rules. For each u ∈W :
1. ° respects Boolean connectives at each world (u ° F ∧ G iff u ° F and
u°G, u°¬F iff u 6°F , etc.).
2. u°2F iff v°F for every v ∈W with uRv.
3. u° t:F iff F ∈ E(u, t) and v°F for every v ∈W with uRev.
We say F is true at a world u ∈W if u°F ; otherwise, F is false at u. Informally
speaking, t:F is true in a given world u iff t is an acceptable evidence term for F
in u and F is true in all worlds v accessible from u via the evidence accessibility
relation Re. A formula F is true in a model if F is true at each world of the
model; F is valid if F is true in every model. Given a constant specification CS,
a model M meets CS if M°c:A whenever c:A ∈ CS.
The following lemma is a straightforward corollary of the definitions:
Lemma 5. u° t:F and uRev yield v° t:F .
9
The above models with singleton W ’s are called Mkrtychev models (M-
models, for short). M-models were introduced in [26] under the name of pre-
models. The logic of proofs LP was shown in [26] to be sound and complete
with respect to M-models.
We call models with R = Re Fitting models (F-models). They were first
introduced in [16] under the name weak models as an epistemic semantics for
the logic of proofs LP. In [9, 17], it was shown that F-models work for S4LP as
well.
Finally, we call arbitrary models of the above class AF-models. AF-models
were introduced in [6] in a general setting for several agents where the need to
separate knowledge and explicit knowledge was apparent. AF-models work for
a wide class of systems, including the ones mentioned above (LP, S4LP, and
S4LPN).
Theorem 1. For any given constant specification CS, the logic S4LPCS is sound
and complete with respect to AF-models that meet CS.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. S4-axioms and rules hold because an
AF-model with respect to the modal language is the usual Kripke model for S4.
LP axioms and rules are guaranteed by the properties of the evidence function
E . Let us check the connection axiom t:F →2F . Suppose u° t:F and uRv.
Then uRev, since R ⊆ Re, and v°F . Hence, u°2F .
Completeness is established by the standard maximal consistent set con-
struction. First of all, we define the canonical model (W,R, E , ° ) for S4LPCS.
Call a set S of formulas in the language of S4LPCS consistent if for no F1, . . . , Fn ∈
S, ¬(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn) is provable in S4LPCS. Consistent sets extend to maximal
consistent sets by the standard Lindenbaum construction. W is the collec-
tion of all maximal consistent sets. Define Γ] as {2F | 2F ∈ Γ} and Γ[ as
{t:F | t:F ∈ Γ}. The accessibility relation R, the evidence accessibility relation
Re and the evidence function E are defined by
ΓR∆ iff Γ] ⊆ ∆ ,
ΓRe∆ iff Γ[ ⊆ ∆ ,
and
F ∈ E(Γ, t) iff t:F ∈ Γ .
Obviously, Re extends R. Indeed, let ΓR∆ and t:F ∈ Γ hold. Then 2t:F ∈ Γ,
since S4LPCS ` t :F → 2t :F . By ΓR∆, we conclude that 2t :F ∈ ∆. Since
S4LPCS ` 2t:F → t:F , t:F ∈ ∆ as well. So, R ⊆ Re. Hence, (W,R,Re) is an
S4LP-frame.
Let us check the evidence function properties.
Monotonicity : F ∈ E(Γ, t) yields t : F ∈ Γ. If ΓRe∆, then t : F ∈ ∆,
by the definition of Re. By the definition of E , F ∈ E(∆, t). Application:
F →G ∈ E(Γ, s) and F ∈ E(G, t) implies s:(F →G) ∈ Γ and t:F ∈ Γ. Since
s:(F →G)→ (t:F → (s ·t):G) ∈ Γ and Γ is closed under modus ponens (as a
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maximal consistent set of formulas), (s·t):G ∈ Γ. Hence, G ∈ E(u, s·t). A similar
argument proves inspection and sum.
Finally, for each propositional letter p,
Γ°p iff p ∈ Γ .
Lemma 6. (Truth Lemma) For each formula F and each Γ ∈W ,
Γ°F iff F ∈ Γ .
Proof. Induction on F . The base case is given by the definitions and the cases
of boolean connectives are standard.
Case: F is 2X.
If 2X ∈ Γ, then 2X ∈ ∆ for each ∆ such that ΓR∆. Since S4LPCS ` 2X→
X, X ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, ∆°X, hence, Γ°2X.
If 2X 6∈ Γ, then Γ] ∪ {¬X} is a consistent set. It it were not consistent,
then S4LPCS ` 2Y1 ∧ 2Y2 ∧ . . . ∧ 2Yn→X for some 2Y1,2Y2, . . . ,2Yn ∈ Γ.
By S4 reasoning, S4LPCS ` 2Y1 ∧ 2Y2 ∧ . . . ∧ 2Yn → 2X, hence 2X ∈ Γ, a
contradiction. So, Γ] ∪ {¬X} is consistent. Take ∆ to be a maximal consistent
extension of Γ] ∪ {¬X}. It is apparent that ∆ ∈ W , ΓR∆ and X 6∈ ∆. By the
definition of a model, ∆ 6°X, hence Γ 6°2X.
Case: F is t:X.
Let t:X ∈ Γ. Then X ∈ E(Γ, t). By the definition of Re, t:X ∈ ∆ for each
∆ such that ΓRe∆. Since S4LPCS ` t:X→X, X ∈ ∆ as well. By the induction
hypothesis, ∆°X. By the definition of forcing at node Γ, Γ° t:X.
If Γ° t:X, then X ∈ E(Γ, t), hence t:X ∈ Γ, by the definition of E . 2
To conclude the proof of Theorem 1, suppose S4LPCS 6` F . Then {¬F} is a
consistent set. Take its maximal consistent extension Γ. Then F 6∈ Γ and, by
the Truth Lemma, Γ 6°F in the canonical model. 2
Theorem 1 also follows from the completeness of S4LP with respect to M-
models proven in [17], where the canonical model W , R, E and° were chosen
as above and Re was defined as Re = R. The completeness proof is essentially
the same as above with the following two minor deviations.
1. To establish the monotonocity property of E , assume F ∈ E(Γ, t). Then
t:F ∈ Γ and 2t:F ∈ Γ by positive introspection in S4LPCS. By the definition of
Re as R, 2t:F ∈ ∆ for each ∆ such that ΓRe∆. By reflexivity, t:F ∈ ∆. Hence,
F ∈ E(∆, t).
2. The case t:X ∈ G in the Truth Lemma. By the definition of E ,X ∈ E(Γ, t).
Take ∆ such that ΓRe∆, i.e., ΓR∆. By positive introspection, 2t:X ∈ Γ, hence
2t:X ∈ ∆. By reflexivity, t:X ∈ ∆ and X ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis,
∆°X. By the definition of forcing, Γ° t:X.
Theorem 2. For any constant specification CS, S4LPNCS is sound and complete
with respect to AF-models with symmetric Re meeting CS.
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Proof. Let (W,R,Re, E ,° ) be an AF-model from the formulation of the the-
orem. By the definitions, R ⊆ Re, R is reflexive and transitive, whereas Re
is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, i.e., Re is an equivalence relation on W
that extends R.
The soundness part can be established by a straightforward induction on
derivations in S4LPNCS. All the cases but C2 follow from AF-soundness of
S4LP, cf. Theorem 1. Let us check C2. Suppose u°¬t:F , and pick v such that
uRv. Suppose v 6° ¬t:F , i.e., v ° t:F . Since vReu, by Lemma 5, u ° t:F—a
contradiction. Actually, we have shown the stability property of AF-models of
the above kind: each formula t:F either holds at all worlds of a given equivalence
class with respect to Re, or it does not hold in all worlds of this class.
The completeness part is proved by the maximal consistent sets construction.
Define the canonical model for S4LPNCS. Call a set S of formulas in the language
of S4LPNCS consistent if for no F1, . . . , Fn ∈ S, is ¬(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn) provable in
S4LPNCS. Consistent sets extend to maximal consistent sets by the Lindenbaum
construction. W is the collection of all maximal consistent sets. As before,
Γ] = {2F | 2F ∈ Γ} and Γ[ = {t:F | t:F ∈ Γ}. Define R, Re, and E by
ΓR∆ iff Γ] ⊆ ∆ ,
ΓRe∆ iff Γ[ = ∆[ ,
and
F ∈ E(Γ, t) iff t:F ∈ Γ .
Finally, for each propositional letter p,
Γ°p iff p ∈ Γ .
Let us check that (W,R,Re) is an S4LPN-frame. Clearly, R is reflexive and
transitive, and Re is an equivalence relation. Furthermore, R ⊆ Re. Indeed, let
ΓR∆ and t:F ∈ Γ. Since S4LPNCS ` t:F → 2t:F , the latter formula is in Γ,
hence 2t:F ∈ Γ as well. Since ΓR∆, 2t:F ∈ ∆. Since S4LPNCS ` 2t:F→ t:F ,
t:F ∈ ∆. So, ΓRe∆.
Let us check the properties of the evidence accessibility relation.
Monotonicity : Let F ∈ E(Γ, t) and ΓRe∆. By the definition of E(Γ, t),
t :F ∈ Γ. Hence t :F ∈ Γ, since G[ = ∆[. So, F ∈ E(Γ, t). Application,
inspection, and sum follow immediately from the definitions.
Lemma 7. (Truth Lemma) For each formula F ,
Γ°F iff F ∈ Γ .
Proof. Induction on F . The base case is given by the definitions and the cases
of Boolean connectives are standard.
Case: F is 2X is treated similarly to Lemma 6.
Case: F is t:X.
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If t:X ∈ Γ, then X ∈ E(Γ, t). Let ΓRe∆. By the definition of Re, t:X ∈ ∆.
Since S4LPNCS ` t:X→X, X ∈ ∆. So, by the induction hypothesis, ∆°X. By
the definitions, Γ° t:X.
If Γ° t:X, then X ∈ E(Γ, t), hence t:X ∈ Γ, by the definition of E . 2
A standard argument concludes the proof of the theorem. Suppose S4LPNCS 6`
F . Then the set {¬F} is consistent and let Γ be its maximal consistent exten-
sion. Then F 6∈ Γ and, by Lemma 7, Γ 6°F . 2
The following stronger form of the completeness theorem holds:
Theorem 3. For each F such that S4LPNCS 6` F , there is an AF-model M̂ that
meets CS such that the evidence accessibility relation in M̂ is total and F is false
in M̂ .
Proof. Take the canonical model for S4LPNCS and a world Γ0 such that Γ0 6°F .
Consider the equivalence class Ŵ with respect to Re such that Γ0 ∈ Ŵ . Since
R ⊆ Re, Ŵ is closed under accessibility relation R: if Γ ∈ Ŵ and ΓR∆, then
∆ ∈ Ŵ . Let R̂, R̂e, Ê , and °̂ be R, Re, E , and ° restricted to Ŵ , respectively.
The resulting structure is an AF-model
M̂ = (Ŵ , R̂, R̂e, Ê , °̂ )
with the evidence accessibility relation R̂e total on its domain Ŵ . Indeed,
we have already checked that (Ŵ , R̂, R̂e) is an AF-frame. The properties of
the evidence function Ê are nothing but the special cases of the corresponding
properties for E .
Lemma 8. For each formula X and each Γ ∈ Ŵ ,
Γ°F iff F ∈ Γ .
Proof. Induction on F . The cases of atomic formulas and Boolean connectives
are immediate.
Case: X is 2Y .
If Γ ° 2Y , then ∆ ° Y for each ∆ such that ΓR∆. In particular, ∆ ° Y
for each ∆ ∈ Ŵ such that ΓR∆. By the induction hypothesis, ∆ °̂ Y , for each
∆ ∈ Ŵ such that ΓR∆. Since R coincides with R̂ on Ŵ , ∆ °̂ Y , ∆ ∈ Ŵ such
that ΓR̂∆. By the definition of forcing in M̂ , Γ °̂2Y .
If Γ 6°2Y , then ∆ 6°Y for some ∆ such that ΓR∆. Since Ŵ is closed under
R, ∆ ∈ Ŵ . By the induction hypothesis, ∆ 6̂°Y . Hence, Γ 6̂°2Y . 2
By Lemma 8, F is false at Γ0. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3. 2
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6 Arithmetical semantics for S4LP and S4LPN
Arithmetical semantics for S4LP and S4LPN is given by interpreting 2F via the
strong provability operator
F is true and provable in Peano Arithmetic PA,
together with interpreting t:F as before:
t is a proof of F in Peano Arithmetic PA.
Using the strong provability operator to obtain S4-compliant logics has been a
well established tradition in provability logic (cf. [1, 12, 13, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29]).
Theorem 4. (Arithmetical soundness of epistemic logic with justification) Let
CS be a finite constant specification. If S4LPNCS ` F , then F is true under any
arithmetical interpretation which translates 2F as strong provability in PA and
t:F as “t is a proof of F in PA.”
Proof. By induction on F . The validity of LP axioms and rules was shown
in [3, 4]. The validity of S4 axioms and rules under the strong provability
interpretation was shown in many sources, cf. [13].
The validity of the connection axiom t:F→2F is a combination of the va-
lidity of the explicit reflection t:F→F , which is an LP axiom, already checked,
and a first order tautology Prf (t, ϕ)→∃xPrf (x, ϕ), where Prf (x, y) is an arith-
metical formula for x is a proof of y.
Finally, the negative introspection axiom ¬t:F→2¬t:F is a special case of
σ-completeness of the arithmetic, cf. [13]. 2
An arithmetically complete system GrzLPN of strong provability with proofs
can be axiomatized by adding to S4LP the modal axiom by Grzegorczyk2(2(F→
2F )→ F )→ F . Models for GrzLPN are F-models with reflexive partially or-
dered frames. This can be established by a combination of the methods from
[9, 28, 29].
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